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A spectre is haunting Europe: Anti-Europeanism. The resounding ‘no’ from the French 
and Dutch referendums on the European constitution is already negatively weighing on 
current debate and – what is decidedly worse – not only on action to further European 
political integration, but also on the type of integration the constitution may bring. Re-
cent developments demand that we drastically cool our previous optimism concerning 
the thrust in an increasing European integration1, imagined as a new political entity ca-
pable of taking its place on the international stage. In addition, the extremely unfavour-
able political climate has been worsened by the failure of the Heads of State and Gov-
ernment Summit in Brussels on June 17 and 18, 2005, marred by a crisis that seems to 
have rocked the very foundations of the EU.  
However, despite the fact that at the political level, European integration has – to say 
the least – suffered a serious blow, the question of Europe’s legal integration remains 
firmly on the agenda even within the minimalistic, Blairite version of the EU that seems 
to prevail. And this for two reasons: Firstly, the EU is functional to the security de-
mands expressed by the single market; secondly, and as a direct consequence, European 
legal integration remains pertinent on account of: 1) the huge body of European norms 
and regulations that already exist; 2) the litigation they trigger; and 3) the issues their 
application generates in terms of concrete cases in the member States. Indeed on the le-
gal level, European integration is implicitly sanctioned by Article 6.2 of the EU Treaty: 
“The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as… they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law”. 
These terms are reiterated in the Preamble, cl. 5 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU, and in arts.- I-9.3 and II-112.4 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe of December 16, 2004. 
Given the current political context marked by the rise of (economic) national indi-
vidualisms, it would appear highly unlikely that legal integration will come from any 
(political) project to develop a real European (private) law system2. Any integration that 
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may be achieved will probably – and perhaps exclusively – be delivered by the work 
and collaboration of the national and European courts, and – in this last instance – by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). From this standpoint, the scholarly debate on 
European integration would be best served by quasi erasing the discussion on the Euro-
pean Constitutional Treaty and returning to focus on the Charter of Fundamental Hu-
man Rights. And so, on several counts this situation calls to mind the famous affirma-
tion of Justus H. von Kirchmann (1938) that “three words corrected by the lawmaker 
are enough to make numerous library sections worthless.” 
The Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights seems destined to be the subject of re-
newed attention. Although technically a document without normative value, it is how-
ever of enormous symbolic value, potentially a crucial reference point for the judge-
ments of the courts, in particular, the ECJ. In fact, art. 6.2 of the TEU has recognised the 
notion of “common constitutional traditions” (CCTs), and in this way it legitimates the 
Court both as creator of the notion and as an active lawmaker. Thus the Charter may be 
correctly considered the “source of cognition” of the normative content of the CCTs 
(Pastore 2003, 202). As a consequence, it is the “instrument interpreting” the “sources 
of inspiration” that sustain the Court in its function of “giving a concrete content to the 
general principles that constitute the direct normative source of the EU’s fundamental 
rights” (Pastore 2003, 201). 
 
 
1. The EU as a Multicultural Society 
Before considering the question of the role that the CCTs might play in the (legal) inte-
gration of the EU, I have to clarify briefly the kind of society we are referring to when 
we think of European society. This will also provide a theoretical framework for the 
concept of the integration that is appropriate to this society. 
European society may be considered a multicultural or pluralist society (Belvisi 
2004a, 2004b)3. The term “multicultural society” indicates a society in which diversity 
obtains, a society whose population is culturally not homogeneous but pluralist. Al-
though this type of society is conflictual in nature, it can nonetheless still be defined as 
peaceful to the extent that political, social and cultural conflicts are managed through 
the channels provided for by democratic political institutions and by the legal system of 
each country. One of the conditions that make such “peaceful conflictual co-existence” 
possible is the mutual respect shown by members of society towards each other and 
their diverse cultures4. 
Therefore talking about a “multicultural society” means taking culture seriously, ac-
knowledging its importance and profound significance – not only for us, but for every 
member of human kind – as man’s very human nature, setting him apart from other 
animals (Gehlen 1990, 64-65). 
If the question of integration is to be broached in an appropriate sociological man-
ner, defining European society as multicultural, implies taking seriously the “fact of 
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pluralism”, i.e., pluralism of values, norms and law: in a word, cultural pluralism. Mul-
ticultural society is a society of differences. As a result, in the argument that follows, 
not only is pluralism sociologically relevant, it is also a principle of normative relevance 
for political theory. In fact, today we may define as “liberal,” a society underpinned by a 
democratic, constitutional political system that undertakes to guarantee pluralism5 and 
keep the conflicts that inevitably arise in a society of this kind within the boundaries of 
the legal system. In this sense we may say that the cultural notion of “pluralism” 
equates the sociological one of “social complexity.” Consequently, any theory dealing 
with the integration of a multicultural society must describe social unity as preserving 
the fact of pluralism, in other words, does not make recourse in the last instance to any 
value oriented device (like, e.g., the Rawlsian “overlapping consensus,” or the Haber-
masian “constitutional patriotism”6) which is deemed able by itself to produce basic 
socio-cultural homogeneity. Rather – and this is the theoretical challenge – integration 
should keep society “united in its diversity.”7 
 
 
2. Social Integration as a Matter of Inclusion 
Given this premise, it is appropriate to ask how we should understand integration in Eu-
ropes’ pluralist society. From an empirically founded, theoretical perspective no single 
value system today can claim to enjoy the unchallenged consensus needed to achieve 
successful social cohesion. 
Today we are no longer convinced by the organic functionalist type of social inte-
gration proposed by sociologists like Emile Durkheim or Talcott Parsons, nor by the 
neo-idealist legal theory of Rudolf Smend. Theirs being a form of thick integration de-
signed to create a strongly homogeneous society, cemented by shared value assump-
tions8 fuelling a collective consciousness which in turn was the basis of social solidarity 
(Durkheim), or the interiorising of culture transformed into a latent social structure 
(Parsons) or again, the State-community that was an existential experience (Smend). 
Within this theoretical context, “integration” is tantamount to “social order” and hence 
to the idea of a society where conflict is a pathological phenomenon, the antithesis of 
social aggregation. 
Despite this, new attempts are continuously being made to reduce society’s com-
plexity by introducing solutions based on either a single principle or closely linked sets 
of efficient causes: such as, rights, or “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas) to consoli-
date democracy, the community to recompose a divided society. Surprisingly this type 
of solution enjoys quite some success among the social scholars.  
It is clear that the problems facing a pluralist and multicultural society – which by 
definition is a conflicting society – require a very different approach to integration, one 
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that eschews the model which proposes universalistic values since these demand ho-
mogenisation and assimilation. In general terms, a complex society can only hold to-
gether if it retains its multiplicity.9 
Furthermore, although fundamental rights are commonly seen as a key means to in-
tegration, they are cast into question by the very universal claims they make. As funda-
mental rights guarantee equality before the law to all, they can retain their integration 
potential only if they consistently uphold and legitimate the right to difference,10 and es-
pecially the rights of minority groups.11 In this case we shall have a universalism that 
generates particularistic claims of recognition.12 All this has direct consequences for the 
question of integration, i.e., social unity.  
With regard to a modern legal system, social unity cannot be achieved by channel-
ling the rules of behaviour towards conformity with a series of supposedly generally 
consented values, but rather by including as legal a much wider range of behaviours that 
may even be deemed “unorthodox” or incompatible with our “customary” institutional 
practices.13 Due to the absolute and unreconcilable multiplicity of values that make up a 
pluralist and multicultural society, the solution envisaged should not so much be social 
integration but social inclusion.  
With this conceptual shift, the whole issue of social cohesion can no longer carry its 
traditional normative weight as a set of common values. Social cohesion and its 
achievement are shifted to a cognitive level recognizing the plurality of values. Social 
unity is now conceived in new way: The traditional concept of a social body grounding 
in an officially recognized set of shared core values (the “political community”) gives 
way now to the concept of a society in which there exist diverse ambits of liberties that 
are justified on cultural bases. Conceived in this way, social inclusion is achieved by 
learning that one can act in different ways to “our own.” 
And so a substantive issue (common value-oriented) becomes a procedural (cultural 
diversity-oriented) issue.14 This ample inclusion could be achieved by following a cog-
nitive and pragmatic principle of social cohesion that has its roots in tolerance. In a plu-
ralist society, this could be a form of tolerance that allows us to let others do what we – 
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at least in theory – would not do. This being on the condition that such different behav-
iours and lifestyles do not jeopardise human dignity and therefore respect the universal-
istic principle of not harming unconsenting third parties.15 
As Will Kymlickla (1995) points out, inclusion that guarantees difference makes it 
possible for the individual to identify himself with, and recognise himself in that society 
whose law allows behaviour in accordance with the rules of the individual’s culture16.  
Such reformulation of the legal meaning of tolerance is grounded in the principles of 
mutual recognition and respect. According to Habermas (2002, 178), both are principles 
of “egalitarian individualism,” that is the only reasonable morals that may be considered 
“strictly universalistic,” and constitute the normative foundation of a liberal social order 
like that of European society.  
But mutual recognition and respect can be generated even in the absence of shared 
values or common and universal reasons.17 In contrast to the theories of Habermas and 
Rawls, consensus and understanding are neither prerequisites, nor outcomes necessary 
to communication or dialogue. What is necessary is an agreement on the communica-
tion procedure and a common preference for not resorting to force,18 i.e., it is necessary 
to keep one’s word, mutual tolerance and negotiated decision-taking.19 
Of course, the outcomes of this approach will neither be full rational understanding 
nor consensus and even less, truth – for, to achieve these there must an idealistic under-
standing of pluralist society as a community. If one accepts the consequences of plural-
ism however, it would seem more realistic to exploit these very “productive misunder-
standings” (N. Luhmann) arising during the “improbable communication” (Luhmann 
1981)20 that takes place among “moral strangers” (Engelhardt 1986).21 
It is doubtlessly true that life in a civil society could not exist if its members did not 
have something in common they were ready to defend. In a multicultural society we 
must be prepared to bear the cost of learning the above-mentioned form of tolerance: 
This is our common, symbiotic munus, i.e., the price we have to pay in order to live to-
gether. 
 
 
3. Integration through Constitution and Law 
Before dealing with the integration value of the “common constitutional traditions” ac-
cording to the general thesis outlined above, I will briefly deal with the question of so-
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cial integration at the level of the constitution, since the role that the former may play in 
this issue depends on the contribution made by the latter. Moreover, my paper deals ex-
clusively with that part of the constitution containing a catalogue of fundamental 
rights,22 since it is with these that the CCTs mentioned in Art. 6.2 of the TEU are con-
cerned. My argument rests on an analytical and stipulative (or, perhaps, better: ideal-
typical) distinction between principles and values. 
For many reasons that have to do with the philosophical nature of the crisis and the 
transformation of value-oriented conceptions (like, for example, ideology, politics, mor-
als and religion) in contemporary pluralist society, a material concept of integration, i.e., 
founded on values, appears totally inadequate, since these values no longer enjoy abso-
lute, unquestioned validity.23 This traditional (and intuitive) concept of integration goes 
back to the origins of social philosophy and was a bedrock concept of sociology. In par-
ticular it was subscribed to by scholars who, paradoxically, at the turn of the 20th cen-
tury witnessed the disintegration of the very notion of a homogeneous society (the best 
example is Emile Durkheim), a state of affairs that led Nietzsche to affirm the “death of 
god.” From a legal-sociological viewpoint, rather than the neo-Parsonian position of 
Habermas (1992, ch. 2, par. 3), what is interesting in this framework is Rudolf Smend’s 
“doctrine of integration.” Developed at the end of the 1920s, Smend’s theory rests on a 
precise philosophy and neo-Hegelian social conception – that of Theodor Litt (1926)24 – 
of a close connection between individual and community. It exerted – and still exerts, 
more or less overtly – enormous influence on European constitutionalists (or at least on 
German and Italian constitutionalists). Smend’s doctrine is interesting from the socio-
philosophical standpoint since it shows that social and political integration through val-
ues contained in the constitution is possible only in a homogeneous society: Here mem-
bers of the “political community” – upheld by the communicative actions among citi-
zens – are able to experience together (Miterleben) the same life situations by virtue of 
their cultural, and hence normative, commonality, a factor that allows them to acknowl-
edge the life of the State as an ethical whole.25 More recently, Niklas Luhmann has con-
vincingly demonstrated how, in a complex society, generalised sharing of life experi-
ences (Erlebnisse: Luhmann 1974, ch. 2 and 4; 1984, ch. 2-3) or the preferences that 
underpin the social objectification of values (Luhmann 1993) is no longer possible. This 
is true of course, not in the restricted terms of a few circumscribed interactions concern-
ing the individual, but proves correct at the general social level: Clearly, I doubtless 
share certain important life experiences with my relatives, but these may well be incom-
                              
22
 “…of the various parts of the constitution… fundamental rights… are the most appropriate to link it with social 
integration”: Grimm 2004, 14. Although acknowledging this, the author does not deal in any depth in his paper with 
the integrative role of the rights. Reading the text, it is somewhat disconcerting to think that Grimm was a German 
Federal Constitutional Court Judge: The passage cited is part of the only (short) paragraph to mention fundamental 
rights in a 15 page paper on the (eventual) role of the (European) constitution as a tool for integration. Given his pre-
vious declarations (Grimm 1995), it comes as no surprise, indeed lends weight to his view that the fundamental rights 
contained in the constitutional treaty in no way foster integration (Grimm 2004,14). What is surprising is that Grimm 
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prehensible to the person sitting next to me at work, or standing behind me in the queue 
at the bank or in the rival team’s stand at the football stadium. 
During the same period in which Smend was developing his constitutional doctrine 
of integration within the pluralist society of Weimar Germany, Hermann Heller, 
claimed that democratic society would not hold together unless it had a minimal social 
homogeneity necessary to bring about that socio-psychological condition that leads to 
the creation of a consciousness and sense of “Us.” This feeling of being part of a collec-
tive entity binds and keeps together individuals despite the opposing interests and con-
flicts that run through society: It makes possible that relative “conformity (Ange-
glichenheit), or adaptation to the social conscience” that brings about the “will of the 
community” (Heller 1992b, 428). 
On the other hand however, Heller underlines that the “ontology” of the modern 
European era has become completely secularised, and in consequence is today located 
entirely in the “here and now” (Diesseits). Indeed, it has even lost spiritual characteris-
tics such as a common language, culture and history that at the beginning of society’s 
secularisation had been important factors for integration (Angleichung): “The spirit of 
our times… in truth, always and only acknowledges the naturalist sphere of realty.” The 
universe of values is no longer relevant for the question of integration, being reduced to 
a “by-product, an impotent ideology and fiction.” Today, the elements that allow indi-
viduals to recognise others as one of their kind belong to the sphere of being, of pure 
existence: One’s “economic, sexual, or racial ways of being” are increasingly decisive 
also for social homogeneity (Heller 1992b, 429). 
In short, with Heller we have learned that today the problem of integration no longer 
centres around the evaluative issue of whether individuals and social groups identify 
with or recognise themselves in the constitution and the political system of a given soci-
ety, thereby legitimating these. Before committing themselves, people pose the (prag-
matic) question of the “acceptance” of that political and constitutional system. It follows 
that they will identify and recognise themselves in the legal-constitutional order that 
permits them to live their own life styles which if necessary may be adjusted according 
to the fundamental principles underlying that same order. 
On this count, as it is always beneficial to stand on the shoulders of the classical 
writers to get a wider view, let me take the teachings of Georg Simmel. Within his 
“value-free” conception, Simmel describes the integrative role of law, intersecting the 
objective perspective characterised by the legal system, with the subjective perspective 
of the social actor. That is the individual who, while a constitutive element of society is 
at the same time inevitably a potentially and existentially destructive force of that social 
order.26 
According to the Simmelian principle whereby “general rules of behaviour are of 
necessity negative in nature” (Simmel 1989, 359-362): “The more general a norm is and 
the more it applies to increasingly wider social circles, the less the fact of following it 
serves to qualify the individual and the less importance it has for that individual; violat-
ing that norm, on the contrary, usually produces particularly strong and notable conse-
quences” (Simmel 1989, 361). Thus, whilst such norms – such as principles and consti-
tutional rules, but also laws, especially criminal laws – lay down the indispensable 
conditions for social unity (integration), only the compliance with the concrete rules of 
everyday life – customs, traditions, practices that impinge more closely on the individ-
ual, and better understood and more followed by her – determines the way in which so-
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ciety really is. It is these norms that determine the actual running of social life and mark 
the existence of the individual: In most instances, what counts is not the abstract obser-
vance of the law not to kill or discriminate against others, but my behaviour on a bus, in 
a café, among family or at work. 
From Simmel we can take the consideration that, in the same way as we comply 
with the norms of the criminal code, our compliance with the “principles” (that vis-à-vis 
third parties may be interpreted as limits or prohibitions to action, i.e., understood as 
norms of negation) is equally necessary if society is to stay united: It is necessary to re-
spect the freedom and dignity of others, not discriminate against them etc. If this were 
not the case, there would be the danger of an authoritarian political system, civil war, 
revolt by minorities or a sort of Hobbesian war of everyone being against everybody. 
Otherwise, the prohibitions that underpin the (constitutional) principles do not immedi-
ately lay down any particular positive behaviours, but rather, like exclusive general 
norms, open up the sphere of allowed action.27 Moreover, complying with the principles 
lays only the minimum (necessary but – in fact – insufficient) basis for social co-
existence. It does not structure co-existence in any definitive way. Rather, co-existence 
is organised and regulated through a multitude of institutions and specific rules that 
fairly closely discipline individual spheres of life whose forms are shared by particular 
social circles and groups. 
Also values are usually conceived as elements of the normative universe and are 
able to orient, motivate and guide action: These too can be considered “reasons for ac-
tion” (J. Raz). However, as Max Weber (1982, 507-508) has shown, values by their 
very nature are bound to carry on a “mortal struggle” for affirmation and supremacy: As 
such they are potential generators of conflict. However, in the “normality of everyday 
life” it is very unlikely they will force us to take “ultimate decisions.” Thus, given their 
conflictual nature, in a pluralist context we need to defuse the potential for political 
strife inherent in a polytheistic value system by adopting a pluralism of principles. Poly-
theism inevitably sets the scene for intractable conflict among values – there no longer 
being the supreme value, many values are vying for supremacy. None is able to impose 
its “tyranny” (Schmitt 1967), however: “Neutralised” and treated as principles, they 
have to settle for a “milder” coexistence, especially to make that coexistence possible.28 
The scenario set by the pluralism of principles fit well with a society, where life-
styles, behavioural patterns and institutions are in possible conflict with one another, but 
not in such a way that the principles they are referred to struggle for supremacy. Princi-
ples are pragmatic and co-operative by nature, oriented to resolving conflict, balancing 
interests and reaching judgements based on fairness.29 In the event of conflict, adher-
ence to principles will not lead to the outright and abrogation of the rules of everyday 
life, but rather should lead to correct those rules and adjust their application in a manner 
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 Simmel (1989, 361), in fact, points out that the opposite of that which is forbidden is not that which is ordered, but 
– apart from things expressly prohibited – that which is permitted. 
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 Zagrebelsky (1992, 9, 11-12), defines the constitution as a “common pact in which everyone may recognize him-
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compatible with the principles.30 This being especially appropriate, since principles are 
indeterminate and give no specific indication as to how action should be conducted. On 
the contrary, the norms of everyday life flow from institutions that establish and give 
certainty as to how action is to be conducted, are not however, refractory to change.31 
In other words, in a pluralist society, (constitutional) principles provide a framework 
for conflict, and are conceived as “reflexive” law (Teubner 1982, 1987), responsive and 
therefore susceptible – to put it in Weberian terms – of “comprehensive” application, 
aiming at negotiation (or compromise)32: I would even go as far as to say, that they are 
susceptible of an application oriented to the principle of reasonableness. 
On the contrary, if fundamental rights are understood as values, the constitutions 
that contain them can be conceived as an “order to integrate” (Integrationsgebot: 
Katzenberger 2002). Their aim is material integration and cultural assimilation, both of 
which undermine the grounds of pluralism. As far as this last principle is concerned, the 
constitution cannot be understood in Habermas’ terms as a citizens’ “identity card,”33 or 
as “normative self-understanding of ourselves” (Habermas 2000)34: It is more appropri-
ate to see it as a document that takes into account and consolidates principles. Con-
ceived of as principles, rights constitute an “integration offer” and provide the “moral 
strangers” (Engelhardt) living in a pluralist society with the possibility of identifying 
and having a sense of belonging within that society. 
The situation may seem paradoxical: The safeguard of cultural pluralism cannot be 
entrusted on cultural elements – values –, since these are the product of one culture. The 
solution must be placed on a neutral level of abstraction vis-à-vis culture. As both the 
product and foundation of a culture, principles are flexible instrument of integration. 
From this viewpoint, principles have a universal validity, not because they can lay claim 
to universal acceptance, but because, in the same way as norms, they can be imposed by 
law, or better: They can be realised with the instruments of law. In this Habermas is 
right: Principles are (and ought to be) valid for everyone while values are valid only for 
those who share them (Habermas 1992, 311, 312).35 
Principles are “values” of a particular type. They can be applied, balanced and cor-
rected pragmatically as the case in hand requires. Their axiological content is not rigid. 
Their pragmatic character lies in the fact that they are universal principles also because 
they have to manifest their claim to be valid, respected and applied in every case in 
which they are implicated. At the same time however, they are particular in terms of the 
way they are applied in concrete cases, and in relation to conflict and balancing with o-
ther principles.36 Finally, values are an ultimate, unquestioned foundation of discourse 
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 Rodotà (1992, 161): “The law … tends to set itself up as the rule making cultures and values compatible rather 
than the rule assigning definitive prevalence and imposing just one of the positions in the field”; similarly, Preuß 
1994, 117-120. 
31
 I gave an example based on the Islamic marriage in Belvisi 2003b. For a detailed review of institutional change in 
a pluralist society from the practical-philosophical perspective, see Zanetti 2004, ch.1 and 3. 
32
 Kelsen (1981, 98, 142) holds that in a democracy, laws must be the fruit of compromise between Parliamentary 
majorities and minorities. All the more reason – I say – for the principle of compromise to apply to the interpretation 
and application of the law. 
33
 For European citizens see Habermas 1996, 2001; see also Spadaro 2001, 629. 
34
 As values, fundamental rights represent “a symbolic order expressing identity and the form of life of a particular 
community founded on law”: Habermas 1992, 312. 
35
 On the values of a pluralist society, in particular, their genesis, universal character, validity and the re-
spect we owe them, see Raz 2001. 
36
 For human rights, see Viola 1998. 
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and narrative, whilst principles have to be sustained by argument, like the justification 
they themselves provide. Values are a question of faith, and about absolute good and ju-
stice, while principles are a question of prudentia, wisdom and fairness. Values and 
principles fit in well with Weber’s distinction of “ethics of intention” (values), and “eth-
ics of responsibility” (principles).37 
In a pluralist society, while what unites does not necessarily bind (as the so-called 
heritage of common values does), it allows people to live their diversities, maintain their 
particular features (see Domenichelli 2002, 11), and see their lifestyles respected, since 
culture constitutes a relevant element. Now, however, respect for culture and the set of 
norms deriving from culture may only be practised within the limits specified by the 
constitution. In the context of the EU, the integration function both on the legal and so-
cial levels, is assured by the Charter of Fundamental Rights38 and by the “constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States,” as “sources of inspiration” (Pastore 2003) 
and of cognition of fundamental rights “as general principles of Community law.” 
 
 
4. Common Constitutional Traditions 
Defining the nature of the EU from the political and legal stance is not a simple task. An 
earlier and fascinating proposal comes from Günter Hirsch, for whom the European 
Community (today the EU) should be understood as a kind of autopoietic legal system: 
“Its true essence [is that of] just a legal community. Law is – so to say – the matter from 
which the Community was produced and at the same time is the matter that it in turn 
produces … if the Community were be divested of the treaties that constitute it, it would 
cease to be. In short: There can be no European integration without the legal commu-
nity; there can be no legal community without legal unity; there can be no legal unity 
without central jurisdiction” (Hirsch 2001, 82).39 The most important and direct implica-
tion of this proposal is the central role assigned to the ECJ in the process of European 
integration, which is to interpret and improve Community law and which is possible 
through the CCTs. 
Both the most negative and the most benign analyses agree on the fact that the no-
tion of “CCTs” is an ex novo creation, “invented” by the ECJ.40 It appeared for the first 
time in the decision in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft Case (11/70 [1970]), and 
has subsequently been confirmed by the case law of the Court concerning the safeguard 
of human rights. Finally, it was definitively recognised and included in art. 6.2 of the 
TEU (as mentioned at the beginning). 
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 From the philosophical-normative viewpoint, La Torre 2000 talks of the rights changing from values into princi-
ples: I am not sure, however, whether the author shares my interpretation of his thought. 
38
 On the integration role of the Charter, see Belvisi 2004a and 2004b; Luther 2001. 
39
 This concept is doubtless compatible with the theses whereby the EU does not need a constitution since it already 
has the constitutive treaties: see Weiler 2003. 
40
 This goes from the accusation that the concept is an “arcana imperii” (Olgiati 2005) to the criticism of adopting 
“rhetoric of tradition” and a common heritage on which to base the “mythical construction of the Euroepan spirit” 
(Williams 2004, 142ff.); opponents recognise that the notion refers appropriately with a concept and legal practices 
that are in turn traditional (Pastore 2003; Ruggeri 2003), although they recognise the issues this raises; see also 
Chessa 2001, 119-126; Cartabia 2005, 17-19. 
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I think that the most critical interpreters lose sight of the fact that the concept is 
much more than a mere legal fiction, since it represents a sort of “Phoenician tale,”41 
i.e., a creative lie: A false narration of the origin and order of things that brings an 
awareness of the virtual state of things and, in so doing, provides a justification too. To 
appreciate fully the fact that we are dealing with such a tale, we should ask ourselves: 
“What function within the legal system does the higher jurisdiction essentially carry 
out?” The answer is: “Its function is to integrate – and, at the supranational level, har-
monise – the legal system and improve the law.” And again: “How can this task be car-
ried out if we remain within the boundaries of the need for legal security?” “By refer-
ring to the (interpretation of the) general principles of the legal system, and in so doing, 
by referring to the legal culture.” Seen in the European context of fundamental rights, 
the arcane nature of the CCTs becomes clear. 
I could almost claim that in fact, the notion of “CCTs” was a forced choice and that 
the ECJ was obliged to find a way to legitimate its action to safeguard rights, in the ab-
sence of any Charter of Fundamental Rights enjoying cogent normative value to resort 
to.42 And it has to be acknowledged that no other concept would have succeeded as well 
as the notion of CCTs! 
The formulation includes two terms – “traditions” and “common” – that already 
prima facie have considerable self-justifying power. The notion of “tradition,” like con-
cepts such as norm, right or institution, has the capacity to add value to the significance 
of what it evokes: “Tradition” describes normatively that which has been “tradito” or 
handed down over time, and hence persists, this has value per se and is to be respected, 
observed, reiterated. This intuitive sense of the concept, one that is almost subliminal, 
concerns only one first aspect of its significance: a static significance, from which Max 
Weber started to construct an ideal type of social action. However, there is also a dy-
namic aspect of tradition, that has been worked out within the hermeneutic thought: On 
this view we can never know the most ancient tradition since this has not come down to 
us. If this is true, then the most ancient tradition is in fact that which teaches us that tra-
ditions change, may be subject to criticism and be modified (Zanetti 2004, 72; Pastore 
2003, 186-187, 195). 
By tying its activity of interpretation and reconstruction to the CC traditions, the 
ECJ thus links its case law to the past, directing it to ensure respect for the principle of 
legal security and stare decisis. At the same time however, the Court does not preclude 
the possibility of acting in an evolutionary perspective, however reassuring, providing 
that this has a continuity with the past, with positive law and with the constitutional 
principles. 
Even if these elements place the CCTs in a positive light, we cannot conceal the fact 
that the picture becomes less clear as soon as the notion is taken seriously: It is “inap-
propriate” to take CCTs seriously since it must not be forgotten that the real nature of 
the concept is functional and legitimising. One thing is in fact clear: The CCTs were not 
worked out by the Court after careful comparative studies (Cozzolino 2002): Rather 
they were freely conceived of as needed.43 If taken seriously, i.e., beyond the “rhetoric 
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 For a famous example see Plato’s Republic, 415a-c. 
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 The European Convention on Human Rights is not part of Community law and through it the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasburg exercises its jurisdiction. 
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 In effect, problems arise around the interpretation of rights by the Court. We know that the ECJ draws out funda-
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of tradition” and from the point of view of the effective common character of the consti-
tutional traditions, it then becomes immediately obvious that these are – as it were – a 
dying breed. If taken seriously, constitutional traditions are immediately shown up as 
not common.44 For instance, it will transpire that among Member States there is no con-
vergence between rule of law and State of law (i.e., Rechtsstaat: Ogorek 2005), nor a 
common meaning for the principle of the division of powers (Schieren 2002). And these 
are questions directly connected with the protection of human rights. Moreover in the 
debate on the scope of the term “common,” it was noted that there is a tendency to limit 
the sphere of its meaning. As a result we have gone from attempts to seek a real com-
monality of constitutional traditions, to considering as common those traditions present 
in the majority of the constitutions of the Member States, or in a certain number of con-
stitutions, or even to consider as “common” a particularly relevant constitutional tradi-
tion present, however, in only one Member State. The principle of “inviolable human 
dignity” is a case in point, only found in the German constitutional tradition (Jones 
2004). 
Therefore, if in the end it is recognised the CCTs “themselves” are a “source of in-
spiration” for Community law (Pastore 2003, 201), one can once again appreciate the 
sense behind the “Phoenician tale”: The CCTs are no more than “European” traditions 
(Ruggeri 2003, 115), developed by the ECJ on the basis of an undoubtedly complex 
hermeneutic process which the national constitutional tradition have (and must have) in-
fluenced (see Cartabia 2005, 18) directly or indirectly, at the beginning or at the end of 
the process and in different ways at different times. 
Having established that the true source of the CCTs is the ECJ in its function to in-
tegrate and harmonise the European legal system, the question of social inclusion within 
the EU can now be broached once more. If correctly understood in the light of the dra-
matic backdrop of the 20th Century (which prompted the founding of the EC-EU, as Ce-
sare Pinelli (2004) rightly maintains), the CCTs have the “virtue of transforming,” or 
Europeanising the different national concepts of the meaning of fundamental rights 
(Jones 2004,169-180). In this way fundamental rights-and-values will be transformed 
into principles that can and must be developed by the ECJ, going beyond controversy 
over the true essence of a particular right according to a particular national legal tradi-
tion (Jones 2004, 181-183, 186-187). 
The work on the CCTs is a preparatory step towards producing European legal prin-
ciples: In this sense the notion of CCTs is that of a device to develop uniform frame-
work principles at a European level. These principles can offer integration and allow the 
inclusion of EU residents despite their social and cultural differences. This integration 
                                                                                      
Member States in virtue of the principle of the supremacy of Community law over national law (see Cartabia 2005). 
The conflict has to do with the awareness both of the fact that the ECJ uses the comparative tool as and when it needs 
to for its judgements, and of the different extension that rights have in the European sphere – even making recourse to 
the catalogue of the Charter – with respect to the wider safeguard provided for by national fundamental rights. The 
instruments to tackle these conflicts are, on the one hand, the doctrine of “counterlimits” (Cartabia 2005, 3-5, 9-10, 
13-15, 20; Palermo 2005, 182-185; Ruggeri 2003, 107-114; Chessa 2001, 123-126), and on the other, recourse to na-
tional constitutional traditions to identify their content and apply the legal provisions – including the decisions of the 
ECJ – that refer to these and that must be applied within the State (Cartabia 2005, 17-21; Ruggeri 2003, 110-116). 
44
 This does not immediately mean that absolutely no “common traditions” exist, nor does it espouse the frankly pes-
simistic view that “the only legal-political experience Europe has in common [is] that of Raison d’Etat”: Olgiati 
2005. On the contrary, I agree with the demand to place the search for common traditions on a historical level rather 
than on that of “bad rhetoric” centred on identity: see Pinelli 2004. In this paper, I deliberately avoid making critical 
remarks on the so-called “European identity” even if the discourse on the traditions naturally tends to include the 
question of identity. 
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model based on tolerance can be achieved if the ECJ is able to combine CCTs with the 
principle of human dignity, embraced not as a communitarian concept, but in the “lib-
eral” sense, as respect for individual freedom of choice and prohibiting discrimination. 
In other words, the case law of the Court will be able to promote social inclusion es-
pecially if it bears in mind, and takes seriously the EU motto: “United in diversity,” 
which for the time being is relegated to the Treaty of the Constitution of Europe, now 
consigned to a European political limbo. 
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